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increased dramatically. There is an alternative.
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management and building low-income rental housing where the demand exists for
it. The authors propose a made-in-Canada Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) that can build on the lessons learnt by the equivalent U.S. program
introduced in the 1980s. The LIHTC would provide tax credits to for-profit or
nonprofit owners of rental housing that is used for long-term low-income housing.  
The LIHTC encourages better location and maintenance of low-income housing by
enabling competition between developers for tax credits and creating a market test
for the viability and need for low-income housing. This tax credit can be used to
complement other government programs that aid renters, such as Rent Supplements,
co-operative housing programs, housing allowances, and local government
programs.
The LIHTC is a better way for Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation
(CMHC) to disburse money to lower levels of government for the purpose of
building social housing. Such an LIHTC is an ideal way to leverage some of the $2
billion in short-term stimulus funding for the construction of social housing into a
sustainable long-term investment.
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M
any renters in large Canadian
cities have difficulty finding
affordable housing. Indeed,
for some time, there has been a near
absence in these cities of new housing
intended for the rental market.
In part, this is the result of income tax reforms in
the 1980s that reduced the attractiveness of this
type of investment (Fallis and Smith 1989). More
important, however, are the effects of the housing
price boom of the 2000s. Observing rising house
prices and expecting large, tax-favoured capital
gains, investors (and homeowners) have been
willing to pay more for condominiums than for
units in multi-unit rental buildings. Developers
have responded by leaving the conventional rental
market and building condominiums instead.
The problem of housing affordability is manifest
in long waiting lists – 135,000 households in
Ontario – for social housing (Peters 2004). For
cities such as Toronto and Vancouver that are
magnets for thousands of immigrants each year, the
affordable housing squeeze is a particularly pressing
issue – in 2006, 40 percent of renters in Toronto
had affordability problems, and the percentage for
other large cities is not greatly less.1 Construction of
condominiums for rent and other small properties,
which has crowded out multi-unit rental
construction, has filled the overall housing demand
gap, but new condominiums usually cannot be
categorized as affordable housing and the filtering
mechanism – through which ageing housing shifts
into lower income occupancy – cannot be depended
on to make them so (Somerville and Holmes 2001;
Skaburskis 2006);2 moreover, this kind of housing
has characteristics that make it unsuitable for many
households. 
Should Canada’s booming cities simply accept the
possible eventual demise of the multi-unit, purpose-
built rental apartment building in the private sector?
We do not think so, for reasons we set out below.
Furthermore, an admirable vehicle, one that has
been tried and tested in the United States over two
decades, is available to remedy the decline. This
vehicle is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC), the premier US affordable housing
program, which is targeted at low- and moderate-
income households likely to experience housing
market problems. An important feature of the
program, which has attracted attention in Canada
for some time (see Lampert and Pomeroy 2002), is
that it is open to both for-profit and nonprofit
housing developers. Moreover, unlike most tax
expenditure programs, its expenditures are limited
and funds are competitively allocated.3
The way this US program runs is particularly
suited to the Canadian Constitution’s division of
powers, under which the federal government has
direct taxation power. As a tax program, it is run
through the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with
supporting information provided by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), entities whose Canadian equivalents are the
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and the Canada
Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC),
respectively. At the same time, the program could
satisfy a great range of preferences among the
provinces, which would control the allocation
process as US states do. Furthermore, it suits the
trend towards increasing decentralization and the
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1 Authors’ calculations using data from Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Housing in Canada Online. The data refer to Census Metropolitan
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2 Some investigations, however, support the view that filtering works; see, for example, Malpezzi and Green (1996). 
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investors in new MURBs the right to deduct from other income, such as employment income, a net rental loss created or increased by a set depreciation
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devolution of social housing programs to the
provinces. Finally, as budgetary expenditures for old
social housing programs fall, mortgages are paid off,
and long-term CMHC commitments expire, these
savings would more than make up for gradually
increasing expenditures under such a program. 
As we show below, the LIHTC rolls into one
program social housing and private sector
housing. It is targeted, with both rent limits and
tenant income limits. It is a tax expenditure with a
set limit on total expenditure, and a transparent
and competitive project-selection process. It offers
the chance to select for-profit and nonprofit
developers that offer the most benefit per tax
expenditure dollar, and it brings the oversight of
syndicators and investors to bear on the
management of nonprofits as well as for-profits.
Because it works through the income tax system, a
Canadian version would exploit the enforcement
capabilities of the CRA to ensure compliance with
its maximum rent and income requirements.
Constraints on the provinces would be minimal so
long as a few basic requirements are met; such
flexibility is a major reason for the popularity 
of the LIHTC in the United States. 
Big-City Rental Housing Markets and
Multi-Unit Rental Housing
Are there signs that, in Canada’s four largest cities
– Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Calgary –
there is a need for additional multi-unit housing?
As Figure 1 shows, rents in all these cities have
risen since an extended building boom ended in
1991. Except in Toronto, most of the increase has
occurred since the mid-1990s, when the federal
government stopped funding social housing
development and when unemployment was high.4
This suggests a deterioration in overall
affordability of the rental market in these cities
over this period, although the deterioration was
slight in Montreal.5 Vacancy rates, on average,
have fallen since the early 1990s (see Figure 2) and
are now at a moderate level, except in Vancouver,
where the market remains tight. It is evident that
vacancy rates are volatile, as one might expect
from the role they play in market adjustment –
the recent rise in vacancy rates in Calgary, for
example, is associated with a steep rise in rents
there in the mid-2000s. Low vacancy rates make
finding housing difficult for low-income house-
holds, which tend to be less profitable to landlords
because they are relatively costly to serve
(Benjamin, Chinloy, and Sirmans 2000), and a
tight housing market makes it easier for landlords
to select higher-income tenants.
The Unique Role of Multi-Unit 
Rental Buildings 
A more fundamental reason than high rent levels
and low vacancy rates for introducing a housing
program such as the LIHTC, however, is the great
decline in the construction of multi-unit rental
buildings. In Toronto, since 2000, the number of
rental construction starts has amounted to less
than one-half of 1 percent per year of the stock of
apartments in multi-unit buildings. In Vancouver
and Calgary, the number of rental starts has been
so low, relative to demolitions and conversions,
that the multi-unit stock actually declined
between 2000 and 2008.6
Why should it matter that a continuing segment
of the rental supply be in multi-unit buildings?
Why not rely on condominiums, single detached
houses, and other small rental properties? The
answer is multifaceted. First, such accommodations
provide little security of tenure, because even a
renter who is a model tenant might be forced to
4 In Toronto, rents increased considerably following a change in Ontario law in 1998 that allowed rents to be boosted without regulatory constraint
when units turned over. Although rents in that city later gradually declined, they remain well above the level of 1991.
5 A reviewer suggests that, in Toronto and Vancouver, since CMHC data show higher vacancy rates for the lowest-rent units, low-income renters in those
cities do not have an affordable rent problem. But if these units are far from public transportation, they might be inaccessible to low-income
households that cannot afford a car.
6 Authors’ calculations based on CMHC, Canadian Housing Observer and Rental Market Reports for Toronto, Vancouver, and Calgary (available at
website: https://www03.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/b2c/b2c/init.do?language=en); and Canadian Housing Statistics, 2000.Commentary 289 | 3




























Toronto Vancouver Montreal Calgary
Figure 1: Rents, 1991 to 2009 – Estimated Quality-Constant, for 2-Bed Units, Multi-Unit Rental Buildings
Note: Rents shown for two-bedroom units in multi-unit rental buildings are average rents divided by theconsumer price index for the Census Metropolitan Area, multiplied by a
factor to allow for depreciation of 0.25 percent per year (for Montreal, this factor is omitted because of substantial new building of conventional stock over the period). The
rationale for this factor is that, when there is little addition to the stock, account should be taken of the deterioration of quality because of wear and tear and obsolescence. 



























Toronto Vancouver Montreal Calgary
Figure 2: Rental Vacancy Rates, 1991 to 2008, Multi-Unit Rental Buildings
Note: Rents shown for two-bedroom units in multi-unit rental buildings are average rents divided by theconsumer price index for the Census Metropolitan Area, multiplied by a
factor to allow for depreciation of 0.25 percent per year (for Montreal, this factor is omitted because of substantial new building of conventional stock over the period). The
rationale for this factor is that, when there is little addition to the stock, account should be taken of the deterioration of quality because of wear and tear and obsolescence. 
Sources: CMHC, Canadian Housing Observer and Rental Market Reports, various issues.| 4 Commentary 289
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7 Information on the Alberta program is available at http://www.housing.alberta.ca/direct_to_tenant_rent_supplement_program.cfm.
8 Earlier, a Supporting Communities Partnership Initiative (replaced in late 2006 by the Homeless Partnering Strategy) was introduced under Human
Resources and Social Development Canada, but this program funds only housing intended to be transitional.
move if the owner or purchaser wishes to occupy
the unit. In principle, tenants in multi-unit
buildings face the same possibility, but the difficulty
of conversion to condominium use makes this
much less likely. The possible extent of the problem
is indicated by the fact that, in Toronto, the
number of rental condominiums fell by 15 percent
between 1996 and 2001 (CMHC 2008a); in many
cases, this means a tenancy was terminated. Being
forced to search for new housing might impose
only a trivial cost on young singles but a much
larger cost on a family or elderly widow.
Second, small rental properties, referred to in the
multi-unit industry as “mom-and-pops,” often do
not have professional management – indeed, by
their very nature, single detached houses cannot
have a superintendent on site. Thus, owners of such
properties have an incentive to rent to resourceful
tenants who cost little to serve, and would-be
tenants perceived not to fall into that category
might have difficultly finding accommodation. 
Finally, for low-income tenants, the most
important reason to maintain the private, multi-
unit housing stock could be that, under current
practice, only such buildings regularly accom-
modate tenants who receive Rent Supplements
(RS). Since social housing agencies and landlords
wish to take advantage of economies of scale in
entering into RS agreements, this precludes
contracts with landlords of small properties. 
Alternative Housing Programs
In addition to Rent Supplements, other kinds of
housing assistance are available to low-income
households in Canada, including the housing
allowances that some provinces offer and the federal
government’s Affordable Housing Initiative.
Housing Allowances
Housing allowances are a monthly cash payment to
low-income households. Most European countries
provide such allowances, as do Australia and New
Zealand (Kemp 2007). In Canada, they are offered
on a continuing basis by provincial governments 
in Quebec, British Columbia, Manitoba,
Saskatchewan (Steele 2007b), and Alberta,7 some-
times only to households in a narrow category, but
there are compelling reasons for providing them to
households in all demographic categories and across
the country. Many low-income households with a
housing affordability problem wish to stay in their
current accommodation and only need additional
cash to help them pay their rent or mortgage.
Typically, this help is needed only for short periods
(CMHC 2008b), and it is much cheaper to help in
this way than to move them into targeted new
housing or buildings that can accommodate tenants
who receive RS (Finkel et al. 2006; Steele 2007b).
Furthermore, it is egregiously inequitable that some
low-income households – most of those in social
housing – should receive a deep subsidy while others
receive no housing help whatsoever (Quigley 2008). 
Housing allowances, however, are no substitute
for new low- and moderate-income housing:
demand-side policy needs to be complemented
with a supply response. In part, this is because some
households have problematic accommodation that
does not provide enough security of tenure, a large
enough number of bedrooms, or enough support.
For example, a major problem in Vancouver,
Calagary, and elsewhere is the number of homeless,
and housing allowances are not rich enough to
move them off the street. More generally, housing
allowances are no remedy for the decline or
stagnation of the stock of multi-unit rental housing.
The Affordable Housing Initiative
In 2001, the federal government returned to social
housing programs by introducing the Affordable
Housing Initiative (AHI) to provide capital grants
for affordable housing.8The AHI provides that
federal funding must be matched by the provinces,
which are responsible for designing their ownCommentary 289 | 5
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9 Federal-provincial agreements under the AHI are called Affordable Housing Programs (AHPs).
10 That part of a depreciation deduction in excess of economic depreciation is a tax subsidy, and its cost in terms of revenue forgone is a tax expenditure.
programs, though constrained by a number of
federal conditions.9 Is this program sufficient? The
answer is no, for a number of reasons. One is its
limited duration, although the five-year extension
announced in late 2008 has for the present saved it
from extinction. Another reason is the cumbersome
nature of a grants system in a confederation:
agreements need to be signed with each province
separately, which takes time and incurs considerable
administrative cost because of the need to accom-
modate both federal and provincial preferences –
for example, the first agreement was reached with
Ontario only in 2003, two years after the program
was introduced.
Canada would obtain a greater overall housing
benefit if programs and needs were matched region
by region with only minimal federal constraints. An
LIHTC not only would provide the framework to
allow better matches, but also would be more
flexible: if a province’s needs changed from year to
year, it could easily change its criteria for projects
from year to year, rather than be locked into a
multiyear federal-provincial agreement. Moreover,
the provinces are well placed to make tradeoffs. The
AHI provides for a maximum federal grant of
$75,000 per housing unit, but since construction
and land costs vary immensely from place to place,
this amount might be more than enough in some
provinces but too little in others. Under an
LIHTC, in contrast, each province would be able
to make its own tradeoff: more housing units with
low funding per unit or fewer units with higher
funding per unit. Further, if a province decided it
needed mixed-income projects – that is, moderately
low and very low income households in the same
building – an LIHTC easily would enable this
approach.
An LIHTC also would be more suited to the
Canadian Constitution than are the AHI and
programs like it. The federal government can fund
housing programs through grants only because of
the residual powers given to it by the Constitution,
and its use of these powers is the source of
continuing friction with some provinces,
particularly Quebec. An LIHTC, however, would
be a program under the tax system and, unlike the
AHI, would not require that provinces match
federal contributions. Provinces might decide they
need additional funds for the kinds of housing on
which they place priority, but adding a subsidy
would be their choice, not one forced on them as a
condition of a federal-provincial agreement. 
An important further advantage of an LIHTC
over the AHI is that it would provide a way for
nonprofits to benefit from a tax expenditure10 that
for-profit real estate investors already enjoy –
namely, the excess depreciation incorporated in the
Capital Cost Allowance (CCA). Putting nonprofits
and for-profits on the same footing in this respect
would provide transparency, making it easier to
compare the true cost of housing. 
Finally, an ongoing but modest LIHTC, which
we describe below, would allow the AHI to exist
alongside the LIHTC. There is now an opportunity
to introduce a LIHTC because its annual cash costs
would start at a very low level – in our proposal,
approximately $47 million – and would increase in
a regular and highly predictable way. Moreover, this
increase would be offset by the decline in annual
budgetary expenditures on housing, as commit-
ments entered into in the 1960s and later wind
down. Currently total federal budgetary expendi-
tures on social housing, mainly due to these old
agreements, are close to $2 billion, to which the
2009 federal budget has added temporary spending
of another $2 billion over two years. The old 50-
and 35-year commitments will soon start expiring
at a high rate, resulting in a dramatic drop in
expenditures over many years, which would provide
room for both the current AHI and a modest,
complementary LIHTC, even under a fiscally
conservative regime. | 6 Commentary 289
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How the LIHTC Works
In the United States, the LIHTC provides tax
credits to investors in low- and moderate-income
housing projects each year for ten years. This period
is far shorter than that of the Canadian
government’s funding commitments for social
housing programs in earlier decades but longer than
those under the AHI. Projects must be kept in low-
income use for 30 years, long enough to provide
substantial security of tenure to tenants but short
enough to be attractive to investors looking for a
profitable use of the property.
The size of the subsidy – that is, the present value
of the ten years’ worth of credits – for a new or
substantially rehabilitated building is 70 percent of
the cost of construction of the LIHTC units, except
in certain high-cost cities such as Boston, where the
rate is 91 percent. Using similar criteria to those in
the United States, Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary,
and some other Canadian cities would qualify for
91 percent credits. The credits are allocated by the
states (in Canada, they would be allocated by the
provinces), which must choose among developers
competing for a slice of the limited total.
Owners of a share in a project are able to save on
taxes by deducting their portion of the project’s tax
credits against their tax payable. An additional,
although much smaller, benefit to investors is the
positive cash flow resulting from the depreciation
deduction. There is also the possibility of a return
on the ultimate sale of the property. The US tax
system makes credits more attractive to
corporations than they would be in Canada, but
less attractive to individual investors. Specifically, in
the United States, a typical corporate investor – but
not the typical individual investor – can deduct a
tax loss stemming from depreciation from other
income. In Canada, neither type of investor
typically can do this,11 but, overall, the Canadian
tax system is more generous than the US system to
individual rental investors. Thus, individuals likely
would be a major market for credits in Canada.12
In the United States, corporations have been the
major purchasers of credits. While any switch of the
major market from corporations to individuals
would tend to make marketing expenses somewhat
higher, it also might make the credits less
vulnerable to events that affect a particular
corporate sector, such as banks. 
Under the US LIHTC, maximum rent and
income requirements ensure that projects are not
aimed at the luxury market. If, over the first 15
years of the project’s life, these are not complied
with, the onerous penalty is full payback of the tax
credits to the IRS. Specifically, at least 40 percent of
the units must have rents that are deemed afford-
able to those with an income that is 60 percent of
the median for that area, as adjusted by HUD.13
Entering tenants must have this income or less, and
the maximum rent is 30 percent of this income. 
The credits that are awarded depend on the
number of units in a building that meet rent and
income requirements. For example, if 80 percent of
units do so, then the value of the credits going to
the project normally would be 80 percent of 70
percent – that is, 56 percent – of the building costs.
In fact, 90 percent or more of units in US projects
qualify as credit units in most cases (Abt Associates
2006) – evidence of scale economies both in
administering the subsidy and in producing a given
quality of unit; for example, it is impracticable to
provide a utilitarian lobby for subsidized tenants
along with a more up-market lobby for other
tenants. 
The limit on LIHTC tax expenditures means a
method is required to allocate credits. In the United
States, allocation is a two-stage process: credits are
11 A restricted group of investors in Canada would be able to deduct a depreciation (CCA) loss – namely, corporations with real estate as their principal
business and individuals holding other, profit-making, real estate. Individuals in the latter position would likely be those, often near retirement, who
have held rental real estate for many years. This is an implication of the fact that the CCA deduction applies to the investor’s total rental income, not to
rental income on a property-by-property basis.
12 In Canada, an individual investor who makes a rental loss before factoring in the CCA may deduct this loss from employment income. In the United
States, investors with employment income over US$150,000 may not do so, because of the so-called passive loss restriction. Thus, in the United States,
rental losses because of high interest expenses, high vacancies, rent declines, or maintenance expenses are not fully tax deductible for individuals, while
in Canada they are. 
13 In Canada, a similar task could be undertaken by the CMHC. An alternative requirement is that at least 20 percent of the units in the project have
rents affordable to a family with an income of 50 percent of the area median income, but few developers choose this alternative.first allocated to the states according to population,
and then the states allocate among applicant
developers, with any unallocated credits going into
a general pot for the following year. The awarding
of credits to developers by the states is governed by
federal legislation. The most important requirement
is a 30-year minimum for low-income occupancy –
indeed, the longer the period the more effective the
LIHTC becomes in providing affordable housing.
Short periods not only remove affordable housing
from the stock but also might force tenants to
move, damaging security of tenure. At the same
time, however, short periods increase the rate of
return to the investment – because of the
opportunity to sell the project at the end of the
commitment period – and encourage developer
participation, so there is a tradeoff. 
The US federal legislation includes a number of
other general rules constraining awards. In general,
in tune with our view that the provinces should be
allowed to choose, subject only to the constraint on
rents and tenant incomes, we do not believe these
rules should be imposed in Canada. However, rules
promoting transparency in the allocation process
should be retained. In the United States, each state
must publish its allocation plan and points system,
which has meant that, as competition among
developers has intensified and other housing subsidy
programs have ended, there has been an increasing
trend toward awarding points for a variety of special
needs, from categories of the elderly to the disabled.
In Canada, provincial housing agencies could give
points for projects targeted at, say, the formerly
homeless or recent immigrants.
The Role of Economic Agents in the 
LIHTC Market
There are three types of economic agent in the
LIHTC market: developers, investors and
syndicators – intermediaries for the first two.
Credits usually are “sold”14 by a syndicator to
many investors, because of both the desire for
diversification and the limited amount of income
tax any single investor owes and which the credits
could offset.15The payments received from
investors then flow, net of fees, from the syndicator
to the developer as equity. The higher the credit
“price”16 for the project and the lower the
syndicator’s fees, the greater the equity going into
the project and the smaller the mortgage needed.
Thus, the greater the equity, the lower the interest
expense and the higher net rental income. There is
some uncertainty about the amount of debt
funding needed until shares in the project are
actually sold, because of variations in the credit
price over time and from project to project. 
Only investors who are confident of being liable
for a substantial amount of tax in every year of the
ten-year period of the credits would find the
purchase worthwhile. In the United States, credits
have been purchased largely by corporations,
especially in the financial sector, but the recent
financial crisis has caused problems in this area. In
Canada, certain utilities, financial institutions,
professionals such as medical doctors with stable
incomes, and high-income retirees – especially those
holding profit-making real estate – would find it
beneficial to buy the credits. Some people might
switch part of their portfolio from units in Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to the credits.
As intermediaries, syndicators play an important
role as sources of information, expert advice, and
discipline – which is especially important for
inexperienced developers. In many respects,
syndicators play the same role as do government
managers in a grants system. They typically package
the credits from many developments into funds
that they then sell to several investors. To some
extent, syndicators perform an insurance function,
because their ability to sell funds depends on their
reputation with investors for sponsoring viable
developments.17 Although state housing agencies
visit projects to ensure compliance with low income
requirements, syndicators also usually have their
own compliance teams. If Canada were to impose
Commentary 289 | 7
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14 This is the terminology used in the industry, but it is not the credits that are sold, but, rather, a share in the project.
15 The legal structure usually is one in which the developer (usually acting also as property manager) is the risk-bearing general partner and investors are
limited partners.
16 The industry uses this term to mean the price of a share of the project.
17 This implies that credits marketed by the best-performing syndicators tend to sell for the highest price.less severe penalties for infractions, resources
allocated to compliance would be lower than in the
United States.18
The LIHTC Development Process
The way the LIHTC works might be easier to under-
stand through a step-by-step outline of the process.
First, the developer (whether for-profit or
nonprofit) determines if a project is feasible. The
developer must find a site, estimate the cost of
new construction or substantial rehabilitation, and
determine whether:
￿ there is sufficient demand at the proposed
rents, perhaps through a contract with a
government housing authority to provide some
units for RS tenants; 
￿ a syndicator is willing to sell the credits the
developer hopes to receive, and the price the
credits are expected to fetch is high enough (the
syndicator’s fees and the credit price will
determine the net equity in the project);
￿ a lender, typically a bank, will approve the size
of mortgage required after taking into account
the funds expected from investors who buy the
credits; and 
￿ additional subsidies can be obtained, if needed
to make the project feasible. 
Second, the developer applies to the agency that
allocates the credits. In a Canadian program, the
agency in British Columbia, for example, would
likely be BC Housing. The application sets out
income maximums (which vary by household size),
rents, the size of units, the tenants to be targeted –
for example, families, seniors, previously homeless,
the disabled – costs, and any information relevant
to, in Canada, the province’s priorities as set out in
the allocation criteria.
Third, the housing agency conducts a
competition, chooses the winners, and awards the
credits received from the federal government. In
Canada, a province might top up the federal credit
with one of its own – as California, for example,
has done – or it could provide grants to successful
applicants. Unlike the case with the AHI, however,
the decision about whether or not to match federal
funding, or to provide any subsidy at all, would rest
wholly with the province.
Fourth, developers who are awarded credits firm
up the mortgage and project financing and build
the project. If financing falls through, the credits
are returned to the housing agency, which passes
them through to the IRS (in Canada, the CRA)
into the general pool for the following year.
Fifth, completed projects start receiving the
stream of credits, which are sold to investors
through the syndicator. Investors may pay up front
or in instalments.
Finally, projects generate the stream of ten annual
credits, which are distributed to investors. Other
components of return might also flow to investors.
Projects are monitored for compliance with rent
and income requirements for 15 years. In addition
to being part-owner, the developer usually manages
the project and ensures compliance. 
US Experience with the LIHTC
At its genesis, the credit received wide support from
organizations such as the National Association of
Home Builders and the National Council of State
Housing Agencies. The LIHTC, in fact, owes its
existence to the US tax reform of the mid-1980s,
when, in the drafting of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, it was realized at the last minute that the
proposed drastic cut in tax shelters for real estate
would sharply reduce the construction of rental
housing and particularly hurt low-income renters.
The LIHTC was hurriedly added to soften the
blow (Case 1991).19 At first, the program was
intended to be temporary, but Congress made it
permanent in 1993, and enacted legislation
establishing inflation indexing in 2001. Currently,
the allocation to the states is $2.40 per capita with
C.D. Howe Institute
| 8 Commentary 289
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program (Olsen 2003).
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proposals to increase it to $3.70 (Desai, Dharmapala,
and Singheal 2008).20
In its early years, the program drew sharp
criticism because of high transaction costs, excess
developer profits, a perception that it was highly
risky, and a still-developing syndication industry.
Credits often were not all used, and competition for
credits – which is important for efficiency – did not
take place. A large chunk of the credit value went
into syndication fees, other transaction costs, and
developers’ profits (Case 1991; Stegman 1991).
Over time, however, transaction costs have fallen,
the erosion of equity by market imperfections has
declined, and some former critics have become
supporters (compare Stegman 1991, 1999).21
Indeed, public finance specialists Desai,
Dharmapala, and Singheal (2008) have suggested
that, under certain conditions, what they call
“investable tax credits” such as the LIHTC might
be the most effective mechanism for delivering a
production subsidy.
The Issue of Crowding Out
An important issue has been the extent to which
the LIHTC crowds out unsubsidized building that
would have occurred if the program did not exist
(see Glaeser and Gyourko 2008). If crowding out is
75 percent – that is, if every 100 additional LIHTC
housing units results in a reduction of 75 in the
construction of non-LIHTC units – the net
number of units of housing generated per dollar of
subsidy is dramatically cut; in fact, Eriksen and
Rosenthal (2008) estimate the extent of crowding
out to be even higher than this. 
For Canada, this issue seems not to be highly
relevant, since most apartment construction in
large, growing cities is for the condominium
market. (Quebec’s relatively greater rental building
is aimed substantially at the seniors’ market.) If an
LIHTC program were to crowd out rental
condominiums, that might well be a desirable
outcome from the point of view of the provision of
suitable low-income housing, for reasons discussed
earlier. Furthermore, rental condominiums are
likely to be costly to the tax system (see Steele
forthcoming). 
Mortgage and Other Funding
LIHTC projects cannot go forward unless they are
able to secure funding to make up the difference
between total development costs and the equity
infused by the credit purchasers. A major attraction
of the program, when lenders are risk averse and
concerned about high leverage, is that funding
through an LIHTC enables a lower loan-to-value
ratio of mortgages. The more efficient the program,
the greater the share of equity funding. Cummings
and DiPasquale (1999) report that, in their sample
– which includes the early, inefficient years of the
US program – first mortgages accounted for 38
percent of total development costs and the
remaining or “gap” funding, such as other
mortgages and loans, 16 percent; this finding is
corroborated by McClure (2000). More recently –
but prior to the current credit crunch – the share of
mortgage funding must have been lower because of
the high price of credits. 
The sources of mortgages indicate the market
perception of the degree of risk in credit projects.
Slightly more than half of first-mortgage funding of
for-profits, but distinctly less in the case of
nonprofits, was provided by private banks in the
US sample of Cummings and DiPasquale (1999).
State and local governments provided a large share,
often at subsidized interest rates. Many of the
nonmarket mortgages, however, funded projects in
risky locations, such as distressed inner-city areas; in
Canada, such subsidies would be less needed. 
Increasing Grant Efficiency and Credit-
Price Volatility
The credit price is an indicator, albeit a flawed
one, of the grant efficiency of the program. The
“price” of a tax credit is the amount paid for a
20 This standard way of stating the funding formula is highly misleading, however, and suggests much lower funding than the actual amount. In fact,
“$2.00 per capita” refers to $2.00 per capita per year for ten years. Once the program reaches a steady state, funding will be $20.00 per capita per year.
21 However, Olsen (2003), a long-time critic of supply-side housing, continues to oppose the LIHTC, as do Glaeser and Gyourko (2008).C.D. Howe Institute
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stream of credits divided by the simple arithmetic
sum of the ten annual credits. For example, suppose
a share in a project costs $7,500 today and gives the
purchaser $1,000 in credits per year over the next
ten years, totalling $10,000; the price of the credit
is then $0.75.
The average price of a credit increased from
around $0.45 in 1987, when the first projects were
put in service, to about $0.84 in 2000; it fell until
mid-2001, then peaked in 2006 at $0.96.22The
rise in average credit prices until the early 2000s –
in part due to falling interest rates – mainly reflects
the increasing understanding and reduced perceived
risk of the LIHTC. There is a wide price range,
with “higher-quality” projects (presumably those
with higher expected positive cash flow and residual
value) rewarded with higher prices; Eriksen (2008)
finds that higher gross permitted rents increase the
credit price.
The Nature of the Projects and 
Tenants Assisted 
About a third of all LIHTC projects have been
nonprofit, quite consistently over the whole period
since the program was introduced (Cummings and
DiPasquale 1999; Abt Associates 2006; and
NCSHA 2008) and far more than the minimum
required by many states. 
Buildings under the program tend to be large,
with more than three-quarters of credit units built
between 1995 and 2003 being in properties of
more than 50 units;23 in contrast, only 20 percent
of all rental apartment units in the United States are
in this size of property. Large buildings are more
common in for-profit projects than for nonprofits,
perhaps because only large, well-established
developers have the expertise to enter the credit
competition. 
A large proportion of these units are suitable for
families: recently, almost a quarter of all credit units
had three or more bedrooms, compared with just
11 percent of all rental units. A far higher
proportion of projects – 63 percent in 2003 – has
been targeted at families than has been true of
social housing in Canada, while 13 percent and 5
percent of projects have been aimed at the disabled
and formerly homeless, respectively. Other data
suggest that developers might be targeting families
to enhance resale value.24 Rents for these units are,
on average, close to market rents, which might
seem surprising given the deep subsidy, but this is a
sign that market rents are too low to generate
unsubsidized developments. 
How the LIHTC Is Able to Serve 
Low-Income Renters
Because the typical tenant has an income of about
60 percent of the area median, credit units targeted
at households with incomes between 51 and 60
percent of median income (of all renters plus
owners in a city) are aimed at the typical, rather
than the very low income, tenant. Unless rents are
set below the maximum or tenants receive
additional subsidy, rents will be too high for very
needy renters. For this reason, the US program, by
itself, might be described most accurately as a
moderate- and low-income housing tax credit, if it
were not for the fact that, in actuality, tenants have
often incomes much lower than the target range.25
The dominance of low-income households in
LIHTC projects occurs for several reasons. First,
many very low income renters in the United States
22 The 1987 price is from the US General Accounting Office (United States 1997), based on information from major syndicators. Other prices are from
various issues of the trade journal Affordable Housing Finance and are usually the views of syndicators. The 2006 number is the median given in a table
of results from a survey of syndicators carried out in May 2006 and published in the June 2006 issue.
23 All data in this and the next paragraph are from Abt Associates (2006) unless otherwise noted; dates refer to the year in which a project was placed in
service. For more recent data for some indicators, see NCSHA (2008).
24 Family projects (unlike those for the elderly, disabled, and formerly homeless) are predominantly funded by 30 percent credits – that is, credits with a
value equal to 30 percent of construction costs. These credits may be claimed, as a right, by projects funded by tax-exempt bonds. Thus, many of the
family projects likely did not have to go through the competitive process that is required to get the 70 percent credits.
25 One cannot be categorical about this, however, since only actual incomes, not target income groups, are given for units in sampled properties.
Properties included both for-profit and nonprofit projects, but median household incomes differed very little between the two groups: $16,800 in
nonprofit projects and $15,600 in for-profit projects (Abt Associates 2006). Developers have an incentive to set the income target high, because that
allows them maximum freedom to set rents and select tenants.Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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currently pay more than 50 percent of their income
on rent (United States 2007). For these renters,
moving into an LIHTC unit and paying a rent
equal to 40 percent of their income would be a big
improvement, although their new rent would be
declared unaffordable by standard criteria. Second,
LIHTC funding serves as a federally funded base
on which to stack state, municipal, or private
funding and donations, both financial and in-kind,
such as land donated by municipalities. This allows
lower rents. Third, projects are required to accept
low-income households that receive housing choice
vouchers (a subsidy similar to Canada’s Rent
Supplement, but with more choice). Because
voucher recipients in tight markets have difficulty
finding landlords willing to take them (Newman
2007), LIHTC projects should house a
disproportionate number;26 in fact, Abt Associates
(2006) found at least one voucher holder present in
47 percent of their sample projects.
A Canadian analogue to the US voucher
provision would be a Rent Supplement quota, to be
put into effect on request of the social housing
agency. For example, the legislation could specify
that a project be willing to enter into an RS
contract for, say, up to one-quarter of its units. The
number of these units in private market buildings is
currently subject to the vagaries of the market.
When markets are loose, landlords have an
incentive to fill their vacancies with subsidized
tenants, but the opposite incentive operates when
markets tighten. Contracts between social housing
agencies and landlords, typically for a maximum of
five years, sometimes end in a period of tightness,
reducing total social housing units in a locality just
when they are most needed. This interrelationship
between the LIHTC and vouchers in the United
States makes both programs more effective.
How a Canadian Funding and
Allocation System Would Work
The version of the US LIHTC program that we
propose for Canada should be quite modest,
because the demand for credits by developers and
the market for credits among investors would be
small early on while market participants gain
experience. Moreover, a modest initial commitment
would make it easier for Ottawa to enact legislation
to make the program permanent, which is
important to provide the incentive for syndicators
and others to invest in putting in place the
knowledge and institutional infrastructure
necessary to use the funds efficiently. Capital
market participants with the capacity to become
syndicators have the advantage of being able to
draw on US experience – indeed, some US
syndicators might decide it would be profitable to
set up a Canadian operation – although the
Canadian capital market has grown in depth and
sophistication since syndicators marketed MURBs.
We propose that, in the first year, cash funding
should amount to just $47.42 million (one-tenth of
the amount shown Table 1, column 3), which is
just 2.5 percent of the CMHC’s budgetary
expenditure in fiscal year 2006/07 for social
housing (column 4), and almost certainly less than
the decline per year in CMHC budgetary
expenditures as old commitments expire. This
amount is very low because only the first credits of
the ten annual ones committed would be set
against taxes. In the second year, $47.42 million in
credits for newly awarded projects would be added
to the $47.42 million in second-year credits for the
initial project; thus, total cash funding in the
second year would be $94.84 million. By year ten,
cash funding would reach its permanent plateau of
$474.2 million.27To make clearer the full tax
expenditure of the initial projects for all Canada, we
show (in Table 1, column 2, last row) the
discounted value of all ten credits, which is the cost
26 In tight markets, landlords are able to be selective, maximizing profit by choosing tenants who are low cost to serve, rather than those who are costly, as
voucher recipients tend to be (Benjamin, Chinloy, and Sirmans 2000).
27 Compare this figure with a total estimated tax expenditure for the LIHTC and multi-family tax-exempt bonds in the United States of US$4.6 billion
in 2007 and an estimated US$5.1 billion for 2009 (Quigley 2008, table 9-4). The LIHTC accounts for over 90 percent of this total.of the commitment to these initial LIHTC projects
– namely, $408 million.28
The total of $47.42 million would be reached
through awarding each province $2 per capita (in
terms of first-year credits), compared with the 2008
per capita allocation in the United States of
US$2.40.29To put the allocations in context,
current federal housing budgetary expenditures
(Table 1, column 4) are 40 times the proposed first-
year LIHTC amount and four times the tenth-year
amount.30The distribution of LIHTC funding
would be quite different from current CMHC
social housing expenditure, as can be seen from
column 5. Although the overall LIHTC amount
would be 25 percent of the CMHC amount, the
ratios for Alberta and Quebec would be 35 percent
and 34 percent, respectively.31These provinces
would receive a far greater share of housing
subsidies than they do currently, while some smaller
entities – notably Saskatchewan and the territories
– would receive less. 
An alternative method of allocating funds would
be according to the number of low-income renters
who are in core housing need – as measured by
C.D. Howe Institute
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28 The stream of ten credits is discounted at 3.5 percent, the assumed long-term Government of Canada nominal bond yield, which is slightly more than
the yield in January 2009.
29 Unlike the state minimum in the United States, there would be no provincial minimum in Canada under our proposal. For Prince Edward Island and
the territories, the amounts would be very small: with a subsidy of $60,000 per unit, for example, only 30 units would be provided in that province.
For this reason, it would be desirable if all credits in the Atlantic provinces were allocated by a single agency, and similarly for the territories.
30 In 2007, the AHI accounted for only $130 million of the nearly $2 billion total (CMHC 2007, table 51).
31 This is related to the decisions of various provinces about whether and when to sign the federal-provincial transfer agreements the federal government
sought in the mid-1990s.
Table 1: Tax Credit Allocation and CMHC Social Housing Expenditures, by Province
Note and sources: Funding is at the rate of $2 per capita for the initial year of credits ($20 per capita nominal total commitment). The present value ofthe full ten years of 
credits is computed using 3.5 percent as the discount rate, giving the cost of the commitments to the federal government; cash flows are received at the beginning of each period.
Annual cash funding in the tenth year of the LIHTC is the budgetary expenditure in the tenth year of the program. CMHC social housing expenditures are the CMHC
budgetary expenditures by province and territory after deductions for research and information transfers, on-reserve, and “other” expenditures (CMHC 2007, table 51). The 
core need-based LIHTC used to compute the ratios in column (6) is estimated from the 2001 renter core need estimates given in CMHC, Canadian Housing Observer,
provincial tables; available at website: http://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/corp/about/cahoob/data/data_013.cfm

























Newfoundland 505,469 6.5 7.6 62.1 12.2 9.9
Prince Edward Island 135,851 1.8  2.0 13.5 15.1 13.2
Nova Scotia 913,462 11.8  13.7 64.7 21.2 23.0
New Brunswick 729,997 9.4  11.0 52.4 20.9 15.6
Quebec 7,546,131 97.4 113.2 332.5 34.0 39.2
Ontario 12,160,282 157.0 182.4 689.0 26.5 27.1
Manitoba 1,148,401 14.8 17.2 95.9 18.0 14.6
Saskatchewan 968,157 12.5 14.5 135.7 10.7 7.9
Alberta 3,290,350 42.5 49.4 139.9 35.3 22.8
British Columbia 4,113,487 53.1 61.7 214.8 28.7 31.5
Yukon 30,372 0.4 0.5 7.3 6.2 5.8
Northwest Territories 41,464 0.5 0.6 32.9 1.9 1.9
Nunavut 29,474 0.4 0.4 58.2 0.8 1.8
Canada 31,612,897 408.2 474.2 1,898.9 25.0 25.0Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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CMHC. As Table 1, column 6 shows, the effect
would be quite similar to that of the proposed
system. For example, Quebec would do much
better under both allocation methods than it does
under the current arrangements. Alberta would be a
striking exception, however, probably largely
because, in such a fast-growing province, detailed
calculations of renters in core housing need lag
census dates by many years. It thus seems wise to
keep to the simple per capita system used in the
United States. The importance of avoiding
constitutional disagreements with the provinces
strengthens this point.
One desirable change from the US system,
however, would be to allow unused allocations to be
kept for a future year – a kind of carry-forward
provision – instead of putting them into the general
pot for the next year. Under this system, a province
might choose to suspend competition when costs
are high or rental markets are predicted to be loose,
and use the held-over allocation in a later year when
conditions are better. This would be especially useful
for small entities such as Prince Edward Island.
How an LIHTC Would Work for Corporate
and Individual Investors
Investors will purchase shares in a LIHTC only if
they can obtain a satisfactory post-tax rate of
return. As noted earlier, that rate depends critically
on having sufficient taxable income over a stretch
of time. Moreover, the tax credits would be
nonrefundable – that is, they would be valuable
only if the investor has a tax liability against which
to deduct them. The return would also depend, as
in the case of any rental investment (see Fallis and
Smith 1989), on whether the investor is a
corporation or an individual, on whether the
investor already holds profit-making rental
properties (such as an office building or duplex),
and on the value of the property at the end of the
period of affordable housing restrictions. In the case
of a nonprofit project, the property normally would
be owned by the nonprofit entity at the end of the
restrictive period, so its value to investors would be
zero. Thus, for a plausible example, the rate of
return on a for-profit property would be slightly
over 12 percent,32 but under 11 percent for a
nonprofit.33
DEPRECIATION RULES: Since, in Canada, a rental
loss created or increased by the CCA is not
deductible against non-real estate income, an
LIHTC investment would be somewhat less
appealing to corporations than it is in the United
States.34The effect of different tax treatment might
be especially important for nonprofits, since these
projects tend to have very low net operating income
after financing, reducing the benefit of the CCA. 
Since rental income tax provisions, overall, are
more generous for high-income individuals in
Canada than in the United States, an LIHTC
investment would be more appealing to individuals
than in the United States. This, along with the lesser
appeal of the LIHTC investment to corporations in
Canada, raises concerns about transactions costs. The
advantage of sales to corporations is that it fosters
marketing economies of scale that minimize
syndicator fees and increase efficiency. There is a risk
that transactions costs would be quite high if
corporations were not the dominant investors. One
way to increase the return of corporate investors in
nonprofit LIHTCs would be to lift the CCA
deduction constraint for these investments. 
32 This is the after-tax rate of return for an individual investor with employment income only. For details see supporting material at
http://www.uoguelph.ca/~msteele1/msteele.htm.
33 The tax credits would be worth nothing to the nonprofit directly, because it typically pays no tax and so would have no tax against which to deduct
the credits. For this reason, while a for-profit developer typically would retain 1 percent of a project, a nonprofit would sell almost all of its project
to investors. It is common in the United States for a nonprofit to retain only 0.01 percent of a project, except that it gets the property at the end of
the 30-year LIHTC period. Thus, its financial return is its tiny share of any pre-tax positive cash flow plus the mortgage-free property at the end of
the 30 years. In the example development, positive cash flow would occur for many years only because the CCA would reduce taxable income to
zero; thus, for tax purposes, for many years there would be no positive rental income. In addition, the property the nonprofit would get at the end
of the investment holding period would be used for nonprofit purposes, and no net income would be received from it.
34 This tax situation might be less important than regulations under the US Community Reinvestment Act in bringing about the dominance of
corporations over individuals as purchasers of credits. The Act is targeted at a peculiarly US problem: the distressed centre of many cities. How
much less the appeal would be to corporations in Canada depends on the how soon in its life, if ever, the project is expected to have positive net
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SUBSIDISATION OF CONSTRUCTION COSTS: Since
the beginning of the LIHTC in the United States,
the subsidy rule has remained the same: 70 percent
of construction costs for new (or substantially
rehabilitated) buildings in general and 91 percent
in high-cost cities.35 For Canada, this subsidy
might be too high. The tradeoff is that the lower
the tax credits as a percentage of construction costs
the more units could be built per dollar of tax
expenditure, but also the greater the chance of less
than 100 percent take-up and little efficiency-
abetting competition for the credits. A made-in-
Canada LIHTC could have a variable ratio,
depending on the profit-seeking status of the
project: in high-cost-cities, say, 80 percent in the
case of for-profit developers and 90 percent for
nonprofits, and for other cities, 60 percent and 75
percent, respectively. Or high ratios might apply
when the program starts, but be lowered when the
program is well established. The trigger might be
the success of the program as indicated by the
percentage of total project financing that is equity,
rather than mortgage or other debt, as roughly
indicated by the credit “price.” 
An LIHTC in the Context of Existing
Housing Tax Expenditures
An LIHTC would be a large tax expenditure, but it
would go only a small way towards offsetting the
large bias in favour of homeownership in the
current tax system. One form of tax expenditure
occurs because, although owners of a rental
building pay tax on net rent – that is, effective gross
rents minus operating expenses and interest –
owner-occupiers pay no tax on the analogous item
for them, net imputed rent.36There is no estimate
of this in the Department of Finance’s tax
expenditure accounts, but the comparable US
expenditure is estimated at close to US$30 billion
in 2006 (Dietz 2008). Thus, a plausible estimate
for Canada is $2-$3 billion, because of the tax
incentive in Canada (but not in the United States)
to pay off a mortgage quickly. Another tax
expenditure for owner-occupiers, the nontaxation
of capital gains on a principal residence, is
estimated to have been $2.6 billion for 2004 and is
projected to be $4.3 billion for 2007.37 A third,
much smaller tax expenditure is for the Home
Buyers’ Plan (Steele 2007a). Together, these three
tax expenditures amount, conservatively, to more
than $6 billion for 2007. There is also some tax
expenditure on multi-unit rental buildings, such as
part of the CCA deduction, which is 4 percent,
much higher than the true depreciation rate – Fallis
and Smith (1989) implicitly assume 2 percent.38
Offsetting this in part, when a property is sold, tax
must be paid on the recaptured CCA; net, the
amount of CCA-related tax expenditure seems
unlikely to be more than $1 billion. Thus, a crude
but conservative estimate is that the tax expenditure
for home ownership is about six times that for
multi-unit rental. Adding the proposed LIHTC
would bring this down only to about four times. 
An LIHTC in the Context of the 
Current Credit Crunch
The current credit crunch has not left the US
LIHTC market unscathed. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, which together held about a quarter
of all credits issued, wrote off more than US$30
billion of credits shortly after their takeover by the
US government in fall 2008, on the grounds that
they did not expect to be able to use the credits for
several years because of their lack of taxable
C.D. Howe Institute
35 In the United States, so-called qualified census tracts also qualify for the high ratio. These are distressed neighbourhoods of a kind that rarely exist in
Canadian cities, perhaps because of our more inclusive social safety net; there seems no good reason to replicate this aspect of the US LIHTC.
36 That is, net imputed rent is the rent the home would command on the market, net of owner expenses, including interest. Net imputed rent would
often be negative in the early years of home ownership because of large mortgage interest expense, but would be large and positive when the mortgage
is paid off, typically when the owner is about age 50.
37 This is on a partial exclusion basis – that is, it is assumed that the tax expenditure is compared to the taxation of capital gains on stocks and other
property, which are taken into income with half the capital gain excluded (Canada 2008, table 1).
38 This is derived from their assumption that operating costs increase at the rate of 5 percent per year – presumably the rate of inflation at the time of
their study – and building value increases by 3 percent per year; the difference is 2 percent.Commentary 289 | 15
income.39This demonstrates the problem in
marketing the credits to a narrow range of
corporations. 
As this is written, in 2009, US commercial
(including multi-unit rental residential) construction
is close to moribund. In part, this is because of the
general liquidity crisis, with funds for project
financing either expensive or unavailable. This has
been exacerbated by the use of commercial
mortgage-backed securities, rather than direct bank
lending, to fund commercial mortgages; the market
for such securities has suffered badly, so that
mortgages are difficult to obtain. In this
environment, any proposed LIHTC project is
obviously problematic, but there are still investors in
the US market40 and some deals are going through.
In Canada, the credit and profit situation is
much better. While major banks in the United
States have suffered huge losses, Canadian banks
posted large profits in the first quarter of 2009 –
down, in most cases, from a year earlier but still
healthy. They have large tax liabilities now and
expect to have them in the future, so they are a
potential source of equity for LIHTC projects.
Furthermore, high-income individual investors are
better prospects as potential buyers in Canada than
in the United States, not only because of Canada’s
different tax system, but also because of its less
severe recession and more secure high professional
incomes. For example, the incomes of highly paid
physicians are protected by Canada’s health care
system, and these individuals have good reason to
expect high income tax liabilities for the ten or
more years needed to make LIHTC credit
purchases justifiable. In addition, mortgages are
more easily available in Canada than in the United
States. Thus, with respect to the two main
components of finance for LIHTC projects –
equity from purchasers of credits and mortgages –
Canada is better off than is the United States. 
Concluding Remarks
Canada now has a widely recognized housing
affordability problem in its high-cost cities, the
fruit, in part, of federal government decisions made
over the past three decades. Ottawa first reduced
incentives to private rental housing investment,
especially in multi-unit buildings, in the 1980s and
then shut down social housing development in the
1990s. There has been a revival of subsidies in the
2000s, but these have been short term and, until
the two-year stimulus boost in 2009, small. The
result has been that additions to the rental supply
have come from small properties such as
condominiums, with expected capital gains often
the main investment incentive. In many cities,
multi-unit rental construction is dormant. 
A US-style Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
would be an attractive way to build affordable
housing and more generally to revive multi-unit
rental construction. An important advantage of an
LIHTC is that it would give nonprofits access to
the tax expenditure involved in the Capital Cost
Allowance. Nonprofits and for-profits would be
placed on the same footing in this respect because
the LIHTC would be delivered via the tax system.
Furthermore, any expansion of the Rent
Supplement program would complement the
LIHTC.
A program with our proposed funding formula
would require $47.4 million of cash in its first year,
reaching a plateau after ten years of $474 million.
This amount would be more than offset by
declining budgetary expenditures for programs still
on the CMHC’s books, as long-term commitments
run down. Further, this tax expenditure for
affordable rental housing would be dwarfed by
annual tax expenditures in the order of $6 billion
for owner-occupied housing.
An LIHTC program would fit in well with the
devolution of programs to the provinces. Within
guidelines, including rent and income limits, set by
tax legislation, such a program would allow each
province to allocate the tax expenditure to
developers according to its preferences. If a province
wished to give heavy weight to nonprofit developers
or to nonprofits in partnership with for-profit
developers, it could do so; if it wished to favour for-
profits, it could also do so. 
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39 The credits, in fact, can be carried forward for 20 years, so that there presumably will be a large positive special item on Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s
books in a few years’ time. They could have sold their credits instead, but that would have destabilized the active credit market.
40 Among them is J.P. Morgan, purchasing on its own account, rather than as a syndicator or through a syndicator; see
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The most problematic aspect of the program
would be the need for the economic agents
involved – syndicators, investors, and developers –
to learn how the program would work and to
understand the risks that would be involved. For
this reason, the program should be permanent, in
order to justify their investment. The oversight of
syndicators and private investors would replace
much of the usual government administrative
apparatus, releasing government money for
housing.
The $2 billion in stimulus money to social
housing in the 2009 federal budget shows that the
government is returning to building social housing.
There is a better way to use federal funds to build
social housing. The $47.4 million in spending
proposed for a LIHTC’s first year and the $94.8
million spent in the second year could leverage the
short-term stimulus into long-term, sustainable
funding. These expenditures could be followed by
others, but putting the first two years under the
stimulus umbrella would provide a convenient
bridge. The broad targeting of an LIHTC program,
within the constraints of income and rent
maximums, would be in sharp contrast to the
narrow targeting of the main housing stimulus
package. Moreover, an LIHTC could deliver
quickly – in the United States, the first LIHTC
projects were complete in the year following
introduction of the program. 
An LIHTC has all the hallmarks of an optimal
answer to the question of how the federal
government should respond to the need to revive
multi-unit rental housing in general, and social
housing beyond that provided by the AHI and the
stimulus, in particular. It would be flexible,
allowing provinces the freedom to use the funds
provided under the program to suit local conditions
and preferences. It would offer the federal
government the advantage of costing a fixed current
amount and a highly predictable future amount
over the medium term. It would put nonprofits on
the same footing as for-profits, in many respects.
And it promises efficiency if established as a
permanent program. 
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41 We assume that the legislation specifies that the discount rate is the government long-term bond yield. Putting an amount in present-value terms
makes it possible to compare amounts received in the future with amounts received today, in order to compare apples with apples. The present value of
an amount due in the future is the amount that, invested today at a set interest rate, yields the given future amount. For example, a promised amount
of $104.50 to be received after one year at an interest rate of 4.5 percent has a present value of $100.
42 This is ten times the annual credit; the difference between $154,875 and ten times $15,488 is rounding error.
43 This understates efficiency if the syndication function contributes value to projects in the form of oversight and technical expertise, or if development
costs are less because the government’s contribution comes in the form of credits rather than a grant.
44 This ignores the cost to the government of the tax expenditure involved in excess depreciation writeoff. This writeoff applies to all rental property –
including, for example, strip malls – so it is not a cost relative to other rental property.
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The “price” of a tax credit is the term commonly used in
the US housing industry for the amount paid for a share
in a property that yields a stream of ten annual credits,
divided by the arithmetic sum of the credits. This concept,
however, is faulty, since it has a numerator that is a present
value but a denominator that is not. When interest rates
fall, the price of a credit will rise for this reason alone,
since the credits are being discounted at a lower rate. In
contrast, a rise in the price when interest rates are constant
reflects increased investor equity per dollar of tax
expenditure. 
The way an LIHTC works is shown by the three
examples in Table A-1, which are all based on a unit
costing $180,000 (row 1), of which 80 percent is
construction costs. Because it is assumed to be in a high-
cost city (as defined by the program), the project is
awarded a stream of credits worth $131,040 (row 3),
which is 91 percent of construction costs, per credit
dwelling unit. In Example 1, we assume that investors pay
only $111,384 (row 7), and the syndicator’s fees (row 8)
are 10 percent; thus, net equity going into the project is
$100,246 (row 9). This leaves $79,754 – that is, 44
percent of total development costs, which the developer
needs to raise. This might be provided fully by a first
mortgage, as in this example. The award to the project is
ten annual credits, which has a present value, using a 4.5
percent discount rate, of $131,040; each credit thus is
calculated to be $15,848 (row 5).41The credit price – that
is, the gross amount investors pay ($111,384) as a ratio of
the simple sum of the ten credits, $158,47542 – is $0.70
(row 12).
Because the credit price is conceptually faulty, we
calculate a better measure of the efficiency of the
program: the “grant” value of the credit (net equity as a
ratio of the present value of the credits (see Wallace
1998)). Here, it is $0.77 (row 13); in other words, 77
cents of private funds goes into the project for every
dollar of foregone government revenue.43
A second example (column 2) shows a much more
efficient, but still realistic situation in the United States
before the current credit crunch. Investors are willing to
pay $151,000 (row 7) for credits costing the government
$131,040. The grant value of the credit is now $1.08 (row
13). Thus, the credit raises more for the project than a
grant costing the government the same amount.44 How
can this be?
First, some US corporations bid up credits to fulfill
Community Reinvestment Act obligations. Second, when
investors “buy credits,” they are actually buying an
ownership share – which gives them not only the credits
but also a share of depreciation allowances, plus, possibly,
a share of any other positive cash flow, including the
market value of the development at the end of the 30-year
commitment to affordability. Low interest rates along with
high credit prices confer a double benefit: they reduce the
loan-to-value ratio of a mortgage – down to 21.7 percent
(row 11) in Example 2 – and reduce interest expenses for a
given mortgage amount. 
Third, the calculation here assumes that investors pay
for the credits fully up front, whereas often they do not.
If the latter is true, the amount paid by investors – for
instance, the $151,000 in Example 2 – has a present
value less than the amount shown. One possibility is that,
in the mid-2000s, developers became increasingly willing
to accept a stretched-out pay-in from investors as the
tradeoff for keeping the increasingly rich cash flow and
residual value. 
Example 3 illustrates a more efficient situation than
Example 1, because the grant value is $0.83 (row 13).
However, because the government bond yield is 9 percent,
a rate prevailing in the United States in the late 1980s, the
credit price is just $0.65, less than the price in Example 1.
This underlines the importance of different interest-rate
environments for the credit price.
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Table A1: The Interaction of the Credit Price, Interest Rates, Syndicators’ Fees and Mortgage Planning
Note: “Annual credit” equals the amount that, when received annually for ten years, has a present value of 1.3 times 70 percent (equals 91 percent) of construction costs; 
this assumes the city is one where development costs are high relative to rents. The discount rate is the long-term government bond rate; it is assumed that the first credit is
received at the beginning of the first year the building is put in service. Investor expenditure for the credits is the amount investors pay to “buy” the credits or, more correctly,
their share in the value of the property; net equity is net of syndication costs. It is assumed that investors make all payments up front. Value of credits in row 13 is taken as 
value to government – that is, the present value is computed at the government interest rate.
Row Example 1 Example 2 Example 3
Development costs ($)  (1) 180,000 180,000 180,000
Construction costs ($)  (2) 144,000 144,000 144,000
Cost to government of credits (legislatively determined as 91% of
construction costs = 0.91 x row (2)) ($) (3) 131,040 131,040 131,040
Long-term government bond interest rate (%) (4) 4.50 4.50 9.00
Annual credit (see note) ($)  (5) 15,848  15,848  18,733 
Total credits (ten times annual credit) ($)  (6) 158,475 158,475 187,327
Investor expenditure for credits (gross equity) ($)  (7) 111,384 151,000 121,000
Syndication costs ($)  (8) 11,138  10,000  12,100 
Net equity (gross equity net of syndication costs) (7) – (8) ($) (9) 100,246 141,000 108,900
First mortgage (1) – (9) ($) (10) 79,754  39,000  71,100 
Loan-to-value ratio of mortgage (10) / (1) (%)  (11) 44.31 21.67 39.50
Credit price (gross equity / arithmetic sum of credits) (7) / (6) ($) (12) 0.70 0.95 0.65
Grant value of credit (net equity / PV of credits) (9) / (3) ($) (13) 0.77 1.08 0.83Commentary 289 | 19
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